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SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES 
FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELI-
GION CLAUSES. By Jesse H. Choper.t Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 198. $24.95. 
J. Matthew Szymanski and Stephen M. Clarkez 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
In his book, Securing Religious Liberty, Jesse Choper articu-
lates a "comprehensive thesis for adjudication of all significant 
issues that arise under the Religion Clauses of the Constitution." 
(p. 1) Choper gets off to a promising start. He dissects the 
Supreme Court's religion cases, illuminates their conceptual in-
coherence, and demonstrates the need for a more principled ap-
proach. Buoyed by his "extensive reflection spanning a period of 
more than thirty years," (p. 190) Choper offers four grand princi-
ples that he believes will resolve all significant issues in religious 
jurisprudence. His principles are helpful in classifying and con-
ceptualizing issues and he uses them as organizational tools for 
determining which governmental actions implicate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause and which implicate the Establishment Clause. 
Choper's application of his four principles is not as helpful, 
however. His deductions are questionable, as they appear to lack 
reasoned justifications and suggest unwarranted results. Ulti-
mately, Choper falls victim to the daunting scope of his project, 
sacrificing depth of analysis for breadth of application. It is, 
therefore, not hard to understand why the book has been sharply 
criticized by reviewers and largely ignored by the courts.J As 
Choper himself candidly acknowledges, his thesis will likely 
prove "unacceptable to every existing interest group." (p. 189) 
Contrary to the suggestion of other reviewers, however, we 
believe the book is worth reading: it offers fresh and provocative 
ideas. One cannot read Securing Religious Liberty without en-
gaging Choper's presuppositions, challenging his ideas, and 
1. Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
2. The authors are associates with the Washington, D.C. area law firm of Gammon 
& Grange, P.C. Our thanks to Michael Woodruff and Scott Ward for their helpful 
comments. 
3. As of this writing, a Westlaw a!lcases search revealed only two citations to 
Choper's book: a single cite by the dissent in Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Uni-
v~rsi~y of Vir~inia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2537 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) and another by the 
c1rcmt court m ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1445 n.lO (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Choper 
for an "interesting discussion" of Establishment Clause implications of tax-supported reli-
gious displays). 
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emerging with a better understanding of the myriad problems 
arising under judicial interpretation of the Religion Clauses. 
In the four sections that follow, this review will (1} summa-
rize Choper's four principles; (2) highlight the early reaction of 
legal academia; (3) apply Choper's four principles to a few cur-
rent topics; and (4) conclude with a critique of Choper's analysis. 
II. THE FOUR PRINCIPLES 
Choper's project is to promote a uniform interpretation and 
application of the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment 
Clause. Because he recognizes that the existing legal standards 
governing these clauses suffer from doctrinal deficiencies and in-
consistencies, (p. 38) Choper wipes the slate clean and attempts 
to develop a new framework for analyzing cases implicating the 
Religion Clauses. He begins with the basic premise, derived 
from the history and text of the First Amendment and from 
"cherished contemporary values," (p. 6) that the purpose of the 
Religion Clauses is to "protect religious liberty and the integrity 
of individual conscience." (p. 9) Choper then articulates four 
principles that he believes will protect religious liberty and limit 
the influence of judges' "intuitive tendenc[ies]" and "personal 
predilections" in adjudicating Religion Clause disputes. (pp. 1, 7-
8) 
A. FREE EXERCISE PRINCIPLES 
1. Deliberate disadvantage principle: "Government action 
that intentionally prejudices individuals because they have or do 
not have certain religious beliefs should be held to violate the 
Free Exercise Clause unless the government demonstrates that 
the regulation is necessary to a compelling interest." (p. 41} 
This free exercise principle is the least controversial of the 
four, and the one most in line with recent Supreme Court hold-
ings. It says that if state action intentionally prejudices (i.e., dis-
criminates against) individuals on the basis of their religious 
beliefs, that action is subject to strict scrutiny and is presump-
tively invalid.4 Choper draws a fine line between legislative mo-
tive and legislative purpose in an attempt to distinguish oblique 
religious inspiration from antagonism toward religion. Legisla-
tive purpose describes the "things a legislator hopes to accom-
plish by the operation of the statute," whereas legislative motive 
4. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
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describes "those things he hopes personally to achieve by the act 
of his vote." (pp. 45-46) Choper then states that religious animus 
in purpose, not motive, is subject to strict scrutiny when legisla-
tors advance "obviously implausible" purposes for challenged ac-
tions. (pp. 49-50) 
2. Burdensome effect principle: "If government regulations 
of conduct that are generally applicable and enacted for secular/ 
neutral purposes (i.e., without intent to provide an advantage to 
religious interests or prejudice individuals because of their reli-
gious beliefs) conflict with action or inaction pursuant to the ten-
ets of a particular religion, the Free Exercise Clause should be 
held to require an exemption under the following circumstances: 
the claimant has suffered cognizable injury; the exemption does 
not violate the Establishment Clause; the exemption does not re-
quire the government to abandon its entire regulatory program; 
the individual's beliefs are sincerely held; violation of those be-
liefs entails extratemporal consequences; an alternative burden is 
imposed if one exists that does not conflict with the religious ob-
jector's beliefs; and the government cannot demonstrate that de-
nial of the exemption is necessary to a compelling interest." (p. 
54) 
In his introduction, Choper contends that the primary pur-
pose of the Free Exercise Clause is to prevent the "state from 
impeding the practices of religious minorities." (p. 13) (emphasis 
added) Choper's burdensome effect principle, however, provides 
exemptions from generally applicable laws for any religious 
claimant that meets certain conventional criteria: sincerely-held 
belief; cognizable burden; and subjection to a burdensome law 
that is not necessary to achieve a compelling governmental inter-
est. But Choper imposes additional, idiosyncratic criteria that 
the claimant must also meet: the exemption cannot force the gov-
ernment to abandon an entire program;s an alternative burden 
(if one exists) must be imposed on the claimant (e.g., Seventh-
Day Adventist must close shop on Saturday instead of Sunday); 
the exemption cannot violate the Establishment Clause (as 
Choper contends it does in Sherbert v. Verner6 because the reli-
5. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) 
(rejecting free exercise claim of Native Americans that would prevent Forest Service from 
harvesting timber and constructing road in area of national forest traditionally used for 
their religious purposes). 
6. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state did not have a compelling interest in 
denying unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist employee who was fired for 
refusing to work on Saturday, and that the state could not force the employee to abandon 
religious convictions in order to qualify for benefits). 
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gious claimant was awarded tax money in the form of unemploy-
ment compensation); (p. 21) and, most fundamental of all to 
Choper's framework, the law (if obeyed) would cause the person 
to suffer extratemporal consequences in the afterlife. 
Extratemporal consequences is Choper's answer to the ques-
tion, "What is 'religion'?" for purposes of applying the burden-
some effect principle. Choper rejects many possibilities, 
including the expansive "ultimate concerns" definition which 
posits that religious faith is "the state of being ultimately con-
cerned" in any ideology, including nationalism, secularism, indi-
vidualism, economic utopianism, or scientific naturalism. (pp. 
69-74) He dismisses this concept of religion as being too vague 
and theologically complex for courts to understand and apply 
with any consistency. (pp. 71-74) Choper also rejects the "tran-
scendental reality" definition of religion, (pp. 80-85) which in-
cludes religions that believe in the temporal significance of 
human actions and temporal, divine intervention (e.g., most ev-
angelical, Judaeo-Christian traditions). Choper believes this def-
inition is overinclusive, as it encompasses traditionally "secular" 
ideologies as well as religious ones. (pp. 84-85) 
Instead, to balance the broad protection afforded by this 
principle's exemptions from government regulation, Choper 
draws a narrow definition of religion: belief in the "ex-
tratemporal consequences" of actions. (pp. 74-80) Claimants for 
religious exemptions must have good faith and sincerely-held be-
liefs that the results of their actions "extend in some meaningful 
way beyond their lifetimes." (p. 77) In Choper's view, the reli-
gions qualifying for this protection are those that comport with 
the "conventional, average person's conception of religion" (e.g., 
belief in God, but not belief in the Republican Party).7 (p. 77) 
Thus, Choper believes courts would apply the "extratemporal 
consequences" definition of religion with greater consistency 
than the ultimate concerns or transcendental reality definitions. 
B. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRINCIPLES 
In his section, "Basic Postulates and Alternative Theories," 
(pp. 1-40) Choper bums off much of the jurisprudential dross of 
the Establishment Clause with convincing candor, beginning with 
7. By "conventional" forms of religion, Choper does not mean mainstream reli-
gion; for instance, he extends his definition to the practice of some Native Americans 
smoking peyote. (pp. 57, 96) 
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the "endorsement" test as advocated by Justice O'Connor.s He 
criticizes the endorsement test on the ground that "federal judi-
cial power should not be invoked to remedy harm no greater 
than 'indignation,' 'offense,' or the 'psychological consequence 
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one 
disagrees."' (pp. 31-32) He fears that the endorsement test may 
be used to overturn legitimate government attempts to afford 
genuine, important religious accommodations. (pp. 31-34) 
Choper points out that government action that benefits or ac-
commodates one religion would violate his deliberate disadvan-
tage principle if such action were intended to stigmatize another 
person's religious beliefs.9 (p. 50) 
Choper does not advocate a strict separation of church and 
state.1o He implicitly repudiates the Lemon test.n Choper ana-
lyzes both the purpose and effect of government action affecting 
religion, (pp. 35, 98-99, 160) but in a less formalistic, more flexi-
ble framework than that of the Lemon test. Government actions 
may have a religious purpose, as long as they do not pose a sig-
nificant threat to religious liberty and are not discriminatory. 
Also contrary to Lemon, the "principal effect" of such actions 
may be to advance religion, as long as they do not pose a mean-
ingful threat to religious liberty. Moreover, Choper never in-
8. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 635 (1989) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
9. Choper quotes William P. Marshall: "A favorable statement about one class is 
not necessarily a correlative pejorative remark about another class." (p. 34) (citing Mar-
shall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 
Ind. L.J. 351, 365 (1991)). 
10. Nor does Choper advocate a separation of religion and politics. He recognizes 
that some degree of religious friction in society is inevitable. Accordingly, he does not 
believe that "divisiveness" should be a criterion for applying the Establishment Clause. 
"[I]f government were actually to ban religious conflict in the lawmaking process, this 
would raise serious questions under the First Amendment's guarantee of political free-
dom as well as religious liberty." (p. 25) 
11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that to survive Establishment 
Clause scrutiny, government action (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) may not have a 
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) may not foster an 
excessive entanglement between government and religion). This test has been severely 
criticized by at least five members of the current Court. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. 
Center Moriches School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (likening 
the Lemon test to a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave 
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried"). See generally Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 Case W. Reserve L. Rev. 795 (1993). Reports of 
Lemon's death were premature, however, as the Court recently revived its three-pronged 
test in Agostini v. Felton, 1997 WL 338583 (1997). 
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vokes the cumbersome "excessive entanglement" prong of 
Lemon as an evaluative criterion.tz 
Choper follows his deconstruction of the Establishment 
Clause with a substitute framework: 
1. Intentional advantage principle: "Government programs 
that deliberately favor religious interests or government actions 
that relieve individuals because of their religious beliefs from the 
burdens of generally applicable regulations should be held to vio-
late the Establishment Clause only if the programs or actions 
pose a significant threat to religious liberty or if they are discrimi-
natory." (p. 97) 
The intentional advantage principle is a variation of the "co-
ercion" test that evaluates state actions based on their effects on 
individual conscience. It states that government actions that in-
tentionally favor religiontJ (e.g., provide exemptions from gener-
ally applicable laws, honor religious holidays, fund religious 
organizations, etc.) violate the Establishment Clause only if they 
"pose a significant threat to religious liberty." State actions pose 
such a threat in one of two ways. 
The first way is by coercing or significantly influencing peo-
ple either to violate their religious beliefs, engage in religious ac-
tivities, or adopt religious beliefs when they would not otherwise 
have done so. For example, exemptions from compulsory draft 
laws for religious objectors would fail the intentional advantage 
principle in Choper's opinion, because they encourage the as-
sumption of religious beliefs and practices by individuals who 
would seek to qualify for the exemption. (p. 131) Similarly, reli-
gious practices in public schools that are "inherently compulsive" 
(e.g., vocal prayer, Bible reading, released time for religious in-
12. See Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling 
the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 681 (1980). 
13. Choper defines "religion" more broadly for Establishment Clause purposes. 
Whereas Choper believes religious exercise should be advantaged under the Free Exer-
cise Clause, he believes it should be disadvantaged, or "disfavored" under the Establish-
ment Clause (pp. 24, 162) (though Choper advocates more of a neutralization of religion 
than a penalization). Thus, no longer does "religion" entail "extratemporal conse-
quences." Rather, religion comprises "all religious beliefs," (p. 115) which include "nar-
row partisan ideologies" (p. 116) and "ultimate truth" (p. 105) worldview teachings. 
Choper explains that if the Establishment Clause were only to reach ideologies concern-
ing extratemporal consequences, it would not apply to a wide variety of activities that 
violate religious liberty; for instance, the public schools could allow voluntary, interces-
sory prayers to God seeking help in the here-and-now (but not in the hereafter), and state 
funds could be granted to a sect that does not believe in salvation or other extratemporal 
consequences. (p. 103) Choper believes that his broader definition of religion for Estab-
lishment Clause purposes precludes these results. 
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struction, and inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Alle-
giance) violate this principle. (pp. 142-43) 
The second way government action threatens religious lib-
erty is by compelling people to furnish financial support to reli-
gion through their tax dollars. Choper considers this type of 
"coercion" to be particularly egregious. For instance, he thinks 
Sherbert v. Vernert4 was wrongly decided, in part, because the 
Court-ordered unemployment benefits in that case amounted to 
"religious coercion in the form of a tax subsidy for religious prac-
tice." (p. 121} Choper would prohibit government from employ-
ing chaplains.ts (pp. 123, 153) However, he would permit 
government to place religious symbols and slogans on public 
property (pp. 154-55) as long as the amount of tax funds devoted 
to such placement is "de minimis." (pp. 154, 157) For instance, 
public schools could post the Ten Commandments in their class-
rooms, (p. 147) and any local, state or federal government could 
constitutionally declare, "Christianity is our religion." (pp. 157-
58) 
Choper's application of the intentional advantage principle 
to religion in the schools produces unique results. Because 
"young people of minority religious groups are extremely sensi-
tive," (p. 141} he thinks the inclusion of the words, "under God," 
in the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional. (p. 142) For sim-
ilar reasons, classroom prayer, graduation prayer, and released 
time religious programs also fail his intentional advantage princi-
ple. (pp. 140-45) In order for religious activity to satisfy the 
principle, a school must provide sufficient alternatives to the reli-
gious activity. For instance, equal access and "dismissed time" 
programs (i.e. religious activities available before or after hours) 
satisfy the test because they are less "coercive" than released 
time programs (i.e. religious instruction or activity available dur-
ing school hours), and because "religion can compete more suc-
cessfully with arithmetic than with recreation." (p. 151, note 173 
(citation omitted)) Choper's theory allows for silent prayer, 
teaching creation science, and excising evolution from the public 
14. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
15. However, Choper believes that a judge's practice of reciting a prayer at the be-
ginning of each court session does not violate the Constitution under the intentional ad-
vantage principle. See Nonh Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation v. 
Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991). Choper distinguishes this case from Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding a state legislature's practice of opening each 
session with a prayer by a publicly paid chaplain), on the grounds that Marsh involved an 
expenditure of tax funds to support the chaplain, thereby violating the intentional advan-
tage principle, whereas Constangy involved "no meaningful expenditure of tax funds." 
(p. 153) 
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school curriculum, because Choper believes these activities are 
less coercive than released time programs or the Pledge of 
Allegiance. 
2. Independent impact principle: "Even if its purpose is 
nonreligious and it has general applicability, government action 
that benefits religious interests and has no independent secular 
impact should be held to violate the Establishment Clause if the 
action poses a meaningful danger to religious liberty." (p. 160) 
Under the independent impact principle, a government ac-
tion's secular effects cannot depend on or derive from the initial 
completion of a religious aim. (p.167) For instance, Choper be-
lieves that vouchers from a state's generally-applicable program 
for vocational rehabilitation should not be applied to religious 
schools,16 because then the state's secular objective would be 
achieved only through a religious program; the state would be 
"employ[ing] religion as an engine of civil policy."11 (pp. 161, 
169, 172) However, Choper believes that a state may support the 
public restoration of church buildings (e.g., Catholic missions, pp. 
161, 163) through similar programs of general applicability, be-
cause such restoration is not derivative from any religious activity 
or effect. 
Choper believes that a state can fund the secular aspects of 
parochial school education without violating the independent im-
pact principle, as long as the state aid is discounted by the 
amount that religious influence reduces secular value. (pp. 178-
83) In other words, the state would pay a parochial school a frac-
tion of the per capita student cost at public schools based on the 
number of hours of "secular" education that the parochial school 
provides. In making this calculation, courts would determine 
what is purely "secular" as opposed to "religious" education, and 
parochial schools would have to justify allocating costs to the 
"secular side of the ledger." (p. 183) Educational voucher pro-
grams likely would be constitutional only if the subsidy to reli-
gious schools did not exceed the cost or value of the secular 
educational services rendered by those schools. (pp. 186-87) 
Choper also would uphold programs in which public school 
16. See Witters v. Washington DepL of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
17. This phrase, which Choper uses repeatedly in this chapter, (e.g., pp. 167, 169, 
172) is borrowed from James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, Sec. 5 (cited in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting). 
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teachers provide secular remedial and enrichment instruction to 
parochial school students on parochial school premises.18 (p. 37) 
III. PEER EVALUATIONS: LEGAL ACADEMIA'S 
RESPONSE TO SECURING RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY 
Securing Religious Liberty has been cited in at least 15 legal 
journal articles and has been the subject of five book reviews. 
The following are capsule summaries of the four important 
reviews: 
1. Eric J. Segall, Doctrinal Legal Scholarship and Religious 
Liberty: A Review of Jesse Choper's Securing Religious Liberty:t9 
From a legal realist perspective, Eric Segall argues that Choper's 
book, like most traditional doctrinal legal scholarship, fails to 
identify and defend the underlying normative presuppositions 
from which its proffered results flow. Rather, he claims Choper 
surveys the legal terrain, derives a few broad principles from that 
terrain, and then argues that particular results logically flow from 
those principles. These principles, argues Segall, are too mallea-
ble to logically dictate Choper's suggested solutions, and Choper 
fails to articulate a reasoned justification for many of his conclu-
sions. For instance, Choper's conclusion that the state may pub-
licly declare, "Christianity is our Religion" is either evidence that 
his Intentional Advantage Principle should be modified or a fal-
lacious inference from the principle itself. His conclusions that 
the government can place religious symbols on public property, 
but cannot pay a chaplain to begin legislative sessions with 
prayer, cannot meaningfully be distinguished, Segall explains, be-
cause in both cases the government is using government property 
and tax dollars to communicate a religious preference. He also 
finds Choper's disfavor towards neutral assistance programs for 
students attending religious schools difficult to reconcile with 
Choper's more favorable treatment of governmental programs 
that provide aid directly to religious schools. Segall states that 
Choper's suggested results favor Establishment Clause values 
18. Choper disagrees with Supreme Court decisions invalidating such programs, e.g., 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 4D2 (1985) (invalidating program in which public school teach-
ers provided remedial instruction in parochial schools); School District of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating program in which public school teachers provided 
remedial and enrichment classes in parochial schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 
(1975) (invalidating program in which public employees provided teaching and counseling 
services in parochial schools). Consequently, Choper likely would approve of the 
Supreme Court's recent overruling of Aguilar and Ball in Agostini v. Felton, 1997 WL 
338583 (1997). 
19. 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 71 (1995). 
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over free exercise values, and that Choper should have defended 
this preference rather than feign objectivity under his four grand 
principles. 
2. John H. Garvey, Is There A Principle of Religious Lib-
erty?:zo This is the only one of the five book reviews of Choper's 
Securing Religious Liberty that applauds Choper's efforts (as a 
"wonderful" book), albeit with many reservations and qualifica-
tions. John Garvey writes that Choper's general principle of reli-
gious liberty is "strangely disembodied,"z1 as evidenced by 
Choper's comparison of religion and race. Garvey believes that 
Choper views religion as more of a social marker-like race-
than as a way of life whose value consists in living out one's 
faith.z2 For instance, Garvey cites a passage in which Choper 
characterizes the harm to Native Americans in Employment Di-
vision v. Smith23 as being harm to their rite of smoking peyote, a 
practice that they consider religious. Their real complaint, says 
Garvey, is that the law prevents them from living as they should. 
Nor does Choper's "extratemporal consequences" definition of 
religion comport with actual religious practice. For instance, 
Garvey points out that some religions do not believe that salva-
tion is contingent on human action. Garvey also believes that 
Choper wrongly equates direct tax assessments for religion, 
clearly forbidden under the Establishment Clause, with indirect 
tax support for religious persons and organizations. Choper, says 
Garvey, "is concerned with the religious liberty of taxpayers 
rather than recipients. "24 
3. Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Un-
thinking Religious Freedom:zs The authors analyze Choper's 
book through the lens of political theory. They believe that a 
determination of the norms and values underlying the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses is a necessary prerequisite to de-
veloping a comprehensive theory of religious liberty, and that 
Choper fails to identify the values from which his principles de-
rive and through which they are applied. Consequently, Choper 
produces results that stem from a "formalistic, idiosyncratic, and 
unsatisfying" interpretation of the Religion Clauses.z6 In partic-
ular, the authors take issue with Choper's dismissal of endorse-
20. 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1379 (1996). 
21. Garvey, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 1382 (cited in note 20). 
22. I d. at 1382-83 (cited in note 20). 
23. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
24. Garvey, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 1384 (cited in note 20). 
25. 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1996). 
26. Eisgruber and Sager, 74 Tex. L. Rev. at 590 (cited in note 25). 
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ment analysis, his analysis of Sherbert v Verner,27 and the 
dominant role of money in Choper's Establishment Clause 
framework. "Not since the gold standard cases has money done 
so much constitutional work, and the idea that dollars should 
dominate our understanding of religious justice in this way is sim-
ply implausible. "2s The authors note that Choper was uncom-
fortable with many of the results his principles produced, and 
questioned why he would work so hard to reach results that un-
dermined his instincts. They suggest, "Choper either did not 
look for or could not find an attractive theory of religious 
liberty. "29 
4. Gary J. Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty:3o Gary 
Simson challenges three of Choper's key propositions: that free 
exercise exemptions should be limited to beliefs that people are 
unwilling to violate for fear of adverse extratemporal conse-
quences; that government endorsement of religion is constitu-
tionally inconsequential; and that public aid should be allowed 
for parochial schools. Simson suggests that a better criterion 
than belief in extratemporal consequences for determining sin-
cere free exercise claims would be whether a claimant's convic-
tion "occupies a place of real importance in that religion. "31 
Next, he explains how Choper underestimates the systematic and 
long-term harms of government endorsements of religion, such 
as the "substantial anguish" of non-adherents' alienation, the 
trivialization of the favored religion, and the distraction to gov-
ernment from such endorsement.32 Finally, Simson suggests that 
the application of the independent impact principle to school 
vouchers would flounder in the quicksand of Choper's complex 
sacred-secular calculations; that Choper's "time-spent" criterion 
for funding the exclusively secular aspects of parochial education 
is impossible to apply, and that such public aid would violate 
Choper's intentional advantage principle. 
IV. THE PRINCIPLES IN ACTION: APPLICATION TO 
CURRENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ISSUES 
Subsequent to the publication of Securing Religious Liberty, 
far-reaching and controversial Religion Clause issues have arisen 
that Choper either does not specifically address in his book or 
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
28. Eisgruber and Sager, 74 Tex. L. Rev. at 582 (cited in note 25). 
29. ld. at 590 (cited in note 25). 
30. 84 Cal. L. Rev. 441 (1996). 
31. Simson, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 449-50 (cited in note 30). 
32. I d. at 464-68 (cited in note 30). 
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addresses in cursory fashion. These issues evidence the difficulty 
of applying Choper's principles: 
1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Responding to and 
overturning the effects of Employment Division v. Smith,33 which 
virtually eliminated strict scrutiny of free exercise claims brought 
pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, Congress overwhelmingly 
passed (unanimously in the House; 97-3 in the Senate) the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").34 RFRA re-
stored the requirement of strict judicial scrutiny of all 
government actions that burdened religious exercise. The princi-
pal effect of RFRA was to require exemptions of religious per-
sons and entities from generally applicable laws (otherwise valid 
under Smith) that substantially burdened their religious exer-
cise.3s However, the Supreme Court recently held RFRA to be 
an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power and struck 
down the law.36 
33. 494 u.s. 872 (1990}. 
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1994). 
35. See, e.g .. In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that RFRA requires 
exempting from fraudulent transfer provision of bankruptcy law the $13,000 in "tithes" 
contributed by debtors to their church during the year preceding their bankruptcy peti-
tion). rehearing and rehearing en bane denied, 89 F.3d 494, vacated and remanded, 1996 
WL 557460 (1997) (for reconsideration, in light of City of Boerne v. Flores. see infra note 
36): State v. Miller. 538 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. App. 1995) (holding that RFRA requires ex-
empting Amish buggies from the traffic law mandating display of Slow Moving Vehicle 
symbol), affd. 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996); Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. App. 1995) (holding that RFRA requires exempting 
a Catholic school from a state's employment nondiscrimination law). 
36. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 WL 345322 (1997) (6 to 3 decision with Justice 
Kennedy writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas. and 
Ginsburg). In Boerne, the Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress's enforcement 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment by attempting to change the meaning of the 
Free Exercise Clause as authoritatively interpreted in Employment Division v. Smith. 
Although this holding invalidated RFRA only as applied to the States, the separation-of-
powers overtones in the majority's opinion may signal RFRA's invalidation across the 
board. Indeed, the Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Boerne 
the Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Young, supra note 35, which applied RFRA to fed-
eral bankruptcy law. Within a few days of the Court's decision, the President declared 
that RFRA still applies to federal laws and agencies and Congress began holding hearings 
and deliberating legislative responses. 
Whatever Choper's views of RFRA, he likely would disapprove of the Boerne major-
ity opinion, which smacks more of defense of territory than of reasoned adjudication. For 
instance, to support its holding that RFRA lacks any "proportionality or congruence" to 
the record of constitutional harms RFRA purportedly sought to remedy or prevent, the 
majority asserts that RFRA's stringent "least restrictive means requirement ... was not 
used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify." 1997 WL 345322 at *15. 
This assertion seriously misstates the "pre-Smith jurisprudence," as RFRA's least restric-
tive means requirement was lifted verbatim from the Court's 8 to 1 decision in Thomas v. 
Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("[t]he state may justify an inroad on religious 
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state 
interest"') (emphasis added), which simply restated the free exercise test announced in 
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Because Choper disagrees with the Court's decision in Smith 
and believes, under the intentional advantage principle, that mi-
nority religions may (and often must) be exempted from gener-
ally applicable laws drafted by the majority, we think he 
approves of RFRA.37 Yet, he refers to RFRA only twice, first 
stating that "Congress has ensured temporary protection for reli-
gious liberty," (p. 58) and later that RFRA is "a particularly sali-
ent example of political solicitude for religious freedom." (p. 
112) Despite these positive allusions, some implications of 
RFRA may run afoul of Choper's principles. For instance, 
RFRA's accommodation was not confined to claimants who be-
lieved that their religious practices entailed "extratemporal con-
sequences,"3s as required under the burdensome effect principle. 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) ("even if (the state could show a compel-
ling interest] it would plainly be incumbent upon the {state] to demonstrate that no alterna-
tive forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment 
rights") (emphasis added) and further developed in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 
(1972) ("(t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only 
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion") (emphasis added). Also defining the "pre-
Smith jurisprudence" were the over 200 lower federal court decisions that nearly uni-
formly applied these restrictive means holdings before the Court issued Smith. For exam-
ple, in Leahy v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1987), then-judge 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Supreme Court had just "restated with unmistakable 
clarity" in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141-44 
(1987) that the Sherbert and Thomas compelling interest/least restrictive means test "con-
tinues to define the Supreme Court's free exercise clause jurisprudence." Yet, inexplica-
bly, Justice Ginsburg joined the Boerne majority in stating just the opposite: that the 
"least restrictive means requirement ... was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence 
RFRA purported to codify." 
This misstatement by the Boerne majority could further erode the free exercise test 
that survived under Smith and its "exceptions." See, e.g., South Jersey Catholic School 
Teachers Organization v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School, 1997 
WL 411536, at *11-12 (N.J. 1997) (quoting Boerne passage criticized above for proposi-
tion that the free exercise test under Smith is a (single-prong] "compelling interest" analy-
sis that is invoked only in "hybrid" cases involving fundamental rights in addition to free 
exercise). The importance of the second prong of the free exercise test cannot be over-
stated, however. See, e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The 
purpose of almost any law ... can be traced to a fundamental concern of government. 
Balancing an individual's religious interest against such a concern will inevitably make the 
former look unimportant. It is therefore the 'least restrictive means' inquiry which is the 
critical aspect of the free exercise analysis.") Boerne is also being cited by states to under-
mine or invalidate other federal civil rights legislation formerly considered to be author-
ized by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), e.g., Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of U. of lllinois, 1997 WL 
409401 (7th Cir. 1997), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), e.g., Autio v. 
State of Minnesota, 1997 WL 367013 (D. Minn. 1997). The authors of this review have a 
work-in-progress documenting and predicting the fallout of Boerne. 
37. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Flores, all seven appellate courts (four 
federal and three state) that considered RFRA's constitutional validity upheld it. 
38. RFRA placed a threshold requirement on claimants to show that the challenged 
government action "substantially burdens" their religious exercise. A majority of courts 
construed this "substantial burden" requirement favorably to claimants. See, e.g., Sasnett 
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Also, some accommodations required by RFRA would have in-
volved the government expending tax dollars to accommodate 
claimants, e.g., building sweat lodges for Native American Indian 
prisoners or paying unemployment benefits to the plaintiffs in 
Employment Division v. Smith.39 Arguably, such expenditures 
would violate the intentional advantage principle. 
2. Charitable Choice. The "Charitable Choice" provision of 
the welfare reform law, the "Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996," permits states to con-
tract with and disburse federal funds to private charitable organi-
zations, including religious organizations, to provide social 
welfare services, while affirmatively prohibiting states from dis-
criminating against religious organizations in administering their 
programs.40 Advocates of Charitable Choice contend that it pro-
tects the institutional autonomy and religious expression of faith-
based social service providers while protecting the religious free-
dom rights of individual welfare beneficiaries. Under Choper's 
intentional advantage principle, arguably, Charitable Choice 
would not infringe on either beneficiaries' or providers' religious 
liberty because states cannot require faith-based providers to 
compromise their religious character, and providers cannot re-
quire beneficiaries to participate in any per se religious programs 
or activities. 
Charitable Choice requires that tax funds be used only for 
"secular" services such as child care, literacy education, job train-
ing, or food service-not for religious instruction, proselytiza-
tion, or worship. Under Choper's independent impact principle, 
tax dollars can be used to fund the secular functions of religious 
organizations (at least in the parochial school context). Here, 
federal funds would only be used to fund secular-not reli-
gious-welfare purposes.41 
v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (substantial burden shown if a prac-
tice "motivated by a sincerely held religious belief [was] significantly or meaningfully cur-
tailed"), affd, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.), vacated and remanded, 1996 
WL 665251 (1997) (for reconsideration in light of City of Boerne v. Flores, supra note 36). 
The minority test, applied consistently only by the Ninth Circuit, required a claimant to 
demonstrate that the burdened practice was (1) "mandated" by the claimant's faith, (2) a 
"central" tenet of religious doctrine, and (3) "substantially" interfered with. E.g., Bryant 
v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). Even the Ninth Circuit occasionally ignores 
this test. See, e.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1995). 
39. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
40. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a (1997 Supp.). 
41. Choper also suggests that the independent impact principle would allow tax ex-
emptions for religious organizations only if the exemption is "commensurate with some 
secular benefit from church to state-for example, social welfare services or 'good works' 
that some churches perform." (p. 172) (citation omitted). 
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However, Charitable Choice could be interpreted as uncon-
stitutional under Choper's independent impact principle. Under 
this principle, tax dollars should not be used to fund the secular 
objectives of religious organizations if the fulfillment of those 
objectives would entail religious activity. For instance, Choper 
would overturn Bowen v. Kendrick,42 in which the Court upheld 
inclusion of religious organizations in a neutral, generally-appli-
cable grant program for teenage sexuality counseling, on the ba-
sis that Congress used religion as an engine of civil policy in 
funding an organization whose counseling involved religious 
principles. (pp. 168, 172) Similarly, Choper could find Charita-
ble Choice to be unconstitutional under the independent impact 
principle, based on the inevitable furtherance of the recipient or-
ganizations' religious missions in the process of providing welfare 
services. The application of Choper's Establishment Clause prin-
ciples to Charitable Choice, then, is intriguing but confusing. 
They neither dictate a clear result nor provide judges clear gui-
dance in resolving the issue of Charitable Choice's 
constitutionality. 
3. Participation of religiously-affiliated schools in school 
voucher programs. Choper briefly addresses vouchers at the end 
of the book. (pp. 186-88) Under his independent impact princi-
ple, Choper opposes the inclusion of religious organizations in 
neutral, generally-applicable public voucher programs when the 
public subsidy exceeds the value of the secular service rendered. 
To guard against such an excess, Choper's secular services system 
would require detailed accounting of religious schools' expendi-
tures of state funds to ensure that voucher amounts were only 
used for secular purposes, and that such amounts did not exceed 
the amounts spent for those same secular purposes in public 
schools. (pp. 182-83) 
Presumably, Choper would overturn general educational 
voucher programs that include religious schools43 but fail to con-
fine tax dollars to secular education. The fact that religion seeps 
42. 487 u.s. 589 (1988). 
43. Choper acknowledges (though he disagrees with its result) that Witters v. Wash-
ington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), "effectively resolves the consti-
tutional question in favor of vouchers." (p. 186) Accord Richard C. Reuben, Are School 
Voucher Plans Constitutional?, 13 Calif. L. 35 (Oct. 1993) (dialogue between Jesse Choper 
and Professor Bernard James); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to 
Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 5, 12-14 (1987). But see Simmons-Harris 
v. Goff, 1997 WL 217583, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App., 1997) (invalidating school choice pro-
gram, under the Establishment Clause, because it "provides direct and substantial, non-
neutral government aid to sectarian schools"), stay granted pending appeal (Ohio, July 24 
1997). ' 
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into the process of achieving the state's secular ends probably 
would taint these programs in Choper's view, coercing unsus-
pecting taxpayers into involuntarily supporting someone else's 
religious ends. As one commentator has noted, however, direct 
tax assessments to benefit religion should be distinguished from 
incidental benefits to religion pursuant to neutral, generally-ap-
plicable programs.44 It is questionable whether tax dollars under 
these programs are actually spent for religion when the state pays 
those dollars to individuals who then choose to apply them to 
religious activities or institutions. As other commentators have 
noted, eligible recipients of these programs have a property in-
terest in the vouchers that government infringes by restricting the 
use of those vouchers.4s Choper does not address this 
argument.46 
4. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Vir-
ginia.47 In Rosenberger, a state university used student activity 
fees to pay the printing costs of student publications, but refused 
to pay the costs of a religious student group's publication. The 
Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause permitted, 
and the Free Speech Clause compelled, the university to subsi-
dize the religious student publication on the same basis as the 
other publications. 
The University's program would probably fail Choper's in-
dependent impact principle. Under that principle, the secular ef-
fect of a generally-applicable program may not depend on or 
derive from the initial completion of a religious aim. (p. 167) 
The University would have funded the religious newspaper as a 
means of achieving its secular goal of supporting student publica-
tions, which would have been accomplished only as a conse-
quence of producing a pervasively religious, proselytizing 
newspaper, thus violating the principle. 
The cases Choper cites as examples of invalid programs 
under the independent impact principle all involve the expendi-
44. See Garvey, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1385 (cited in note 20). 
45. See Eisgruber and Sager, 74 Tex. L. Rev. at 583-84 (cited in note 25). 
46. Nor does Choper address the issue of whether state-facilitated financing pro-
grams for colleges are constitutional if they include religiously-affiliated schools. For ex-
amples of Supreme Court cases holding that religiously-affiliated colleges may participate 
in such programs, see Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) 
(upholding state noncategorical grant program that included religiously-affiliated college 
among its recipients); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding state-facilitated 
bond financing program that included religiously-affiliated college); Tilton v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding state capital improvement grant program that included 
religiously-affiliated college). 
47. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). 
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ture of tax money.4s In contrast, Rosenberger could be read as 
permitting the state to apply private funds, rather than tax dol-
lars, to religious student organizations, since the funds in Rosen-
berger were comprised of required student activity fees. 
Characterized in this light, the program could satisfy the in-
dependent impact principle.49 Because the funds were extracted, 
controlled, and applied by the state, however, they bore a strik-
ing resemblance to tax dollars. Once again, it is not clear how 
Choper's principles should be applied to this case, though 
Choper has criticized its holding.so 
V. APPLYING THE RELIGION CLAUSES THROUGH A 
GLASS DARKLY 
1. Presuppositional truisms. Choper's analysis is deductive. 
He begins with four grand principles (none of which receives 
much inductive support), then applies these principles in deter-
mining whether Supreme Court religion cases were decided 
rightly or wrongly. Choper struggles to be fair and balanced in 
fashioning his principles. To avoid subjectivity and "personal 
predilections," his analysis is process-oriented rather than result-
oriented. He follows his principles to the conclusions he feels 
they logically lead to, then takes great pains to let the reader 
know that he does not agree with all the results he manipulates 
his principles to achieve. 
Inevitably, Choper's application of his principles is more 
normative than descriptive, as such application involves moral, 
political, and policy judgments based on normative presupposi-
tions.si In determining and applying his principles, Choper 
makes a number of value judgments based on presuppositions 
that he doesn't clearly identify or sufficiently support. To 
Choper's credit, he recognizes that many of his judgments will 
reflect his personal values, and he promises to "self-consciously 
48. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Washington Dep't of 
Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
49. The intentional advantage principle does not apply here, since the program was 
generally applicable and not designed to support religion. By way of analogy, however, 
Choper believes that a state may require copies of the Ten Commandments to be posted 
in public school classrooms, if the copies are paid for by private funds (p. 147) (citing 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)). Even though the state's intent in requiring the 
posting of the Ten Commandments would be to favor religion, no tax money would be 
used and no one's religious beliefs would be coerced or influenced in a significant way. 
50. See Jesse H. Choper, Dangers to Religious Liberty From Neutral Government 
Programs, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 719 (1996) (criticizing and minimizing the "neutrality" 
holding of Rosenberger). 
51. See Segall, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. at 72-73 (cited in note 19). 
412 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:395 
identify those points along the way where predilection rather 
than logic provides a significant link in the discussion." (p. 11) 
However, he fails to address many of these predilections. For 
example, Choper's book reveals a relativistic perspective that the 
First Amendment should be interpreted in accordance with con-
temporary values and traditions, in addition to the history and 
text of the amendment. (pp. 1, 6, 122, 171, 177) Because the 
framers could not have foreseen such developments as public ed-
ucation, antidiscrimination law, and unemployment insurance, 
(p. 5) Choper believes that we must interpret church/state 
problems arising in these and other contemporary contexts in ac-
cordance with contemporary values. However, Choper does not 
define "contemporary values." He does not provide guidance for 
how they should be determined, nor does he discuss how the cor-
rect contemporary values should be chosen from among compet-
ing sets of values in applying the Religion Clauses. 
Implicit in Choper's work is a naturalistic, reductionist view 
that only that which is scientifically "verifiable" in the physical 
world belongs to the "rational," whereas that which is not verifia-
ble, or is taken on faith, is not debatable. (pp. 82-83) Because 
religion is a matter of subjective "belief," Choper does not be-
lieve that we can discuss it rationally or argue its substantive mer-
its.sz Nowhere in his book does Choper acknowledge that 
52. See generally Francis Schaeffer, Escape From Reason (InterVarsity Press, 1968) 
(describing how modern philosophy considers religion to be in the nonrational, unverifi-
able realm of "freedom" rather than in the rational realm of "nature"); accord Phillip E. 
Johnson, Reason in the Balance: The Case Against Naturalism in Science, Law & Educa-
tion (InterVarsity Press, 1995). Ironically, the latter book, authored by Choper's longtime 
Berkeley colleague, was published the same year as Choper's Securing Religious Liberty. 
Johnson, like Choper, clerked for Chief Justice Earl Warren in the 1960s before joining 
the Berkeley law faculty and, like Choper, has lectured and published widely on "law and 
religion." Although their credentials are similar, Johnson's predilections on the topic are 
quite different: 
The most influential intellectuals in America and around the world are mostly 
naturalists, who assume that God exists only as an idea in the minds of religious 
believers. In our greatest universities, naturalism-the doctrine that nature is 
'all there is'-is the virtually unquestioned assumption that underlies not only 
natural science but intellectual work of all kinds .... It is said that naturalism is 
science, whereas theism belongs to religion; naturalism is based on reason, 
whereas theism is based on faith; and naturalism provides knowledge, whereas 
theism provides only belief. Science, reason and knowledge easily trump reli-
gion, faith and belief. 
Id. at 7-8, 10. Using a form of the "ultimate concerns" definition of religion, Johnson 
explains that "metaphysical naturalism" is the "established religious philosophy" in 
America, id. at 35-50, a "story that is promulgated aggressively in the educational world 
and the media with the resources of government." Id. at 15. Johnson says there is noth-
ing "sinister" or even "inherently unconstitutional" about the de facto existence of such a 
public religious philosophy, and that it "is established not in the sense that it is formally 
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religion could be a rationally defined and chosen value in his hi-
erarchy of "contemporary values." 
Choper holds a dualistic view that secular effects of govern-
ment programs can and must be completely independent of reli-
gious expression or activity, and that religious content dilutes the 
"full secular value" of an activity or service. (pp. 164-67, 177) 
Choper assumes that courts, in determining whether secular ef-
fects are independent of religious activity, can make clear distinc-
tions between the secular and the sacred, even within a religious 
environment such as a sectarian school. (pp. 179-83) This view 
overlooks the complex nature of presuppositions underlying all 
beliefs, whether religious or secular. It places the judiciary in the 
position of having to evaluate the substantive content of belief, 
ensuring that the religious quantum of such content is appropri-
ately de minimus to qualify for funding. Choper does not explain 
how judges should make such fine distinctions between the secu-
lar and religious, or strike a proper balance between the two. 
Nor do his four principles provide such guidance. Under 
Choper's hierarchy of the Religion Clauses, in which the Estab-
lishment Clause trumps the Free Exercise Clause when the two 
are in conflict, (pp. 24, 54, 97, 160) the secular would inevitably 
triumph over the sacred. 
2. Recipe for confusion. Although the results of Choper's 
analysis are creative, some of them undermine the validity of his 
principles. For instance, Choper believes that Witters v. Washing-
ton Dep 't of Services for the Blinds3 should be overturned and 
that the state should refuse to allow recipients of aid under gen-
erally-applicable funding programs (e.g., scholarships for the 
visually impaired at issue in Witters) to apply that aid to religious 
organizations or activities. (p. 169) Such a refusal, however, 
risks violating Choper's deliberate disadvantage principle. Be-
cause religious schools would be required to distinguish the "reli-
gious" elements of their educational programs from the "secular 
elements" of those programs, the schools would have an incen-
tive to secularize in order to qualify for state aid. Furthermore, if 
enacted ... but in the sense that it provides a philosophical basis for lawmaking and 
public education." ld. at 35-36. 
Choper's expansive definition of religion for Establishment Clause purposes includes 
beliefs in "ultimate truth" and general "ideologies." (pp. 104-05, 116-17) Naturalism, as 
defined by Schaeffer and Johnson, fits into this definition. Thus, if government funding 
and support is directed at persons or institutions that espouse a naturalistic ideology, it 
would raise serious Establishment Clause concerns in the area that troubles Choper the 
most-public funding and support of religious beliefs and activity. This problem escapes 
Choper's attention, evidently because of his own naturalistic presuppositions. 
53. 474 u.s. 481 (1986). 
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states were to refuse to allow religious schools to participate in 
voucher programs, such exclusion arguably would constitute a 
"deliberate disadvantage" to both religious schools and voucher 
recipients. This exclusion would discriminate against individuals 
because of the religious content of their beliefs, and would dis-
criminate against schools on the basis of the religious content of 
their curricula, thereby violating Choper's first free exercise 
principle.s4 
Another example is the inconsistency in Choper's applica-
tion of Establishment Clause principles to Sherbert v. Vernerss 
and Employment Division v. Smith.56 He believes that Sherbert 
was wrongly decided because the Court-ordered unemployment 
benefits amounted to "religious coercion in the form of a tax sub-
sidy for religious practice." (p. 121) Although the plaintiffs in 
Smith also sought unemployment benefits, Choper believes they 
should have won their case. Rather than address the unemploy-
ment compensation issue in Smith, however, Choper merely re-
cites part of the Court's holding-that Oregon did not have to 
grant a free exercise exemption from its law prohibiting posses-
sion of peyote. (p. 55, 57-58) Never does he affirm, let alone 
mention, the Court's holding that Oregon may deny unemploy-
ment benefits premised on a claimant's violation of a generally-
applicable law. This omission is selective, since Choper urges at 
once that Smith be reversed and that free exercise exemptions 
allowing receipt of government funds violate the Establishment 
Clause. Choper never addresses this inconsistency. 
In attempting to make fine, nuanced distinctions, Choper 
often makes arbitrary ones. For instance, Choper applies his in-
tentional advantage principle to conclude that the government 
may make Good Friday a paid state holiday, but only if the state 
does not intend to observe Good Friday as a religious holiday.s? 
(pp. 155-56) Yet, the same state may declare, "Christianity is our 
religion" as long as it does not spend significant tax funds in the 
54. Arguably, money given to individuals pursuant to neutral programs such as that 
in Witters does not actually belong to the government-or to the taxpayers-but rather to 
individuals who have met the criteria of such programs and are therefore entitled to the 
money. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits are a 
matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them, and that such per-
sons are entitled to procedural due process before benefits may be terminated); see Eis-
gruber and Sager, 74 Tex. L. Rev. at 583-84 (cited in note 25). 
55. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
56. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
57. Choper's expansive definition of religion under the intentional advantage princi-
ple includes ultimate concerns and "nonreligious ideologies." (pp. 104-05, 116-17) Yet, 
Choper does not necessarily consider Good Friday to be a religious holiday for purposes 
of applying the principle. 
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process. (pp. 157-58) Although Choper's questionable applica-
tion of his principles produces such incoherent results, he never 
questions these results; he simply bears them, sometimes in grim 
resignation.ss 
3. Separation anxiety. The purpose of Choper's project is to 
develop a comprehensive thesis for adjudication of all significant 
issues that arise under the Religion Clauses (p. 1) and, ulti-
mately, to protect religious liberty in America. (p. 9) In his ef-
forts to preserve the separation of church from state money 
under the Establishment Clause, however, Choper loses sight of 
an essential part of the religious liberty equation: facilitating the 
free exercise of religion. Instead, what emerges from Choper's 
presuppositions, principles, and applications is the message that 
religion is more of a dangerous, irrational force than a positive 
good and that religion should be neutralized by government and 
the courts, lest it coerce taxpayers to support religion or suffer 
unwilling cognitive dissonance or conversion. 
Choper's analysis does not reflect the nature of religious ex-
ercise in our society or the cultural context in which the Religion 
Clauses operate (i.e., the increasingly a-religious nature of our 
society and the sensitivity with which government officials and 
agencies shield themselves from religious activity and influ-
ences9). As a result, Choper is overly sensitive to such issues as 
tax funds ultimately making their way into religious organiza-
tions' coffers and the effect that the Pledge of Allegiance, re-
leased time, or graduation prayer will have on the conscience of 
public school children. 
Nor does Choper recognize the possibility, under the Reli-
gion Clauses, of non-coercive cooperation between government 
and faith-based organizations in addressing causes and seeking 
solutions to societal problems such as poverty, crime, and addic-
tion. He is more concerned with constructive separation than a 
constructive partnership, and apparently believes the latter is an 
oxymoron. 
58. In his "Afterword" section, (pp. 189-90) Choper indicates his dissatisfaction 
with many of his results, such as permitting public schools to excise the study of evolution 
from the curriculum, allowing local governments to erect sectarian displays on public 
property, permitting government to declare that "Christianity is our religion," and 
prohibiting the accommodations at issue in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and 
Wa/z v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
59. See Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief (Basic Books, 1993) (arguing 
that religion and religious influence have been excised from public life and should be 
restored). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Choper's failure to justify his normative presuppositions and 
apply his corresponding Religion Clause principles consistently is 
not unique to him; the same problems plague the Supreme 
Court's largely arbitrary and inconsistent jurisprudence in this 
area. As difficult as it is to interpret and apply the Religion 
Clauses, Choper demonstrates that it is even more difficult to as-
certain abstract fundamental principles underlying those clauses 
and apply them consistently and sensibly. Choper criticizes the 
Supreme Court's approach to state aid to schools as 
"'sacrific[ing] clarity and predictability for flexibility,"'60 (p. 176) 
but he substitutes one flexible, confusing framework for another. 
In applying Choper's principles, judges inevitably would give ef-
fect to their individual predilections, further confusing and mysti-
fying Religion Clause jurisprudence. 
In the end, Choper's work is a provocative but unpersuasive 
attempt to bring clarity and consistency to the muddled arena of 
Religion Clause jurisprudence. He understands the problems in-
volved in such an undertaking, but cannot avoid them. His pro-
ject overreaches and thus collapses under the weight of its 
laudable idealism. Choper does not provide much hope for a 
uniform interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses. Instead, he only adds his distinctive, confusing spin to a 
rather arbitrary and ambiguous jurisprudence. 
EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS. By David Kyvig.t 
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 1996. Pp. 
604. Hardcover, $55.00. 
John Vifez 
Of all the innovations of the U.S. Constitution, the process 
of providing for formal constitutional change through an amend-
ing process may be one of the most underappreciated. When 
properly functioning, such a mechanism renders violent revolu-
tion unnecessary by allowing for legal changes without the resort 
to violence. A well-constructed amending mechanism also helps 
60. Citing Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). 
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